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1 Introduction
Since ancient times, a number of economic, social and political activities involve groups
that are in opposition to one another. Intergroup conicts have thus been extensively stud-
ied within di¤erent disciplines. For example, in social psychology, social conicts are the
main focus of the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A central feature of this
theory is the recognition that humans have a tendency to discriminate between "in-group"
and "out-group" members even though "groups" are not formed according to some intrinsic
characteristics or preferences but by random assignment. Furthermore, it is recognized that
a stronger conict with an "out-group" is likely to reinforce group cohesion by strengthening
in-group favoritism (see Tajfel, 1982). More recently, social psychologists have conducted
experimental studies in the laboratory which conrm that, in general, inter-group compe-
tition improves intra-group coordination in simple team games (see, e.g., Bornstein et al.,
2002; Bornstein, 2003). There is also an important literature on human evolutionary biology
that explains, often using dynamic games and simulations, that non-kin altruism towards
members of ones own group together with out-group hostility what is called "parochial"
altruism is a powerful force of the evolution of behavior in human societies (see, e.g., Choi
and Bowles, 2007; Lehmann and Feldman, 2008; and Rush; 2014 or Glowaki et al. 2017,
for a survey). As to the economic literature, the analysis of group conicts is principally
based on contest or rent-seeking games between groups (Katz et al. 1990 and Nitzan, 1991).1
A number of relatively recent experimental studies aim at testing this type of games and
generally conclude that subjects over contribute to group e¤ort compared to the theoretical
predictions (see, e.g., Abbink et al., 2010, 2012; Ahn, et al., 2011; and Sheremeta, 2018, for
a survey).
In this paper, we provide an evolutionary and theoretical analysis of the emergence and
stability of in-group favoritism in intergroup conict by using a model of group contest.
More precisely, there is large population of players who are randomly matched in groups
that compete for an exogenous prize. We think of local (common-access) resources, each of
which being targeted by a certain number of groups. The probability of winning the con-
test of a certain group is given by a Contest Success Function (CSF) that depends on the
group memberse¤orts relative to memberse¤orts of competing groups. We consider that
each group has two members and that the CSF has the standard ratio-form such that each
groups probability of winning the prize is equal to the proportion of its collective e¤ort out
of the sum of collective e¤orts by all groups involved in the contest. However, in contrast
to most analysis on group contests that assume a summation technologywith perfect sub-
stitutability between individual e¤orts, we consider that the e¤ective level of group e¤ort 
its impact function is given by a technology featuring a varying degree of complementarity
between individual e¤orts. Indeed, as rst pointed out by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), team
or group production exists to the extent that it can exploit complementarities of inputs and
this might be especially the case in a context of competition between groups (see also Kolmar
and Rommeswinkel, 2013; and Brookins et al., 2015).
Another crucial feature of the present analysis is that each player has a utility his/her
"preference type" that depends not only about his/her own material payo¤ but also on
1For a review of the literature on group contests, see Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007, Section 7), Corchón
(2007, Section 4.2), and Konrad (2009, Chapter 6).
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that of his/her teammate. We rst remain agnostic as to whether this concern is altruistic
or spiteful, that is to whether each member puts a positive or negative weigh on the payo¤ of
his/her teammate when deciding his/her contribution to collective e¤ort. We then character-
ize the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of this group contest game when group members have
heterogeneous "other-regarding" preferences within and across groups. Next, we use the
indirect evolutionary approach pioneered by Güth and Yaari (1992) to endogenize players
preferences. That is, evolution does not play directly at the level of strategies but indirectly
at the level of preferences while players act rationally. In other words, preferences determine
the playersactions which in turn determine (individual) material payo¤ or "tness" 
and ultimately the evolutionary survival of preferences.2 Thus, applying the concept of evo-
lutionary stability (see Maynard Smith, 1982) to preferences rather than to strategies 
allows us to endogenize attitudes towards ones partner.
It is worth pointing out that a change in the preference type and thus in the equilibrium
action of one player has strategic implications in that it induces a change in equilibrium
actions of other players. The di¢ culty of the present analysis stems from the fact that
there is a dual level of strategic interactions between players. The rst one occurs within
groups. Each group member decides on his/her contribution to group e¤ort according to
his/her preferences given the preference type and the resulting action of his/her teammate.
The second level of strategic interactions occurs across groups. A change in the preference
type of one or both members of the same group is passed on group e¤ort which in turn
induces a change in the winning probabilities for all groups. The evolutionary success of a
certain preference type is the product of this dual level of strategic interactions. And we are
particularly interested by the impact of the existence of within-group complementarities and
by the intensity of the competition between groups, as measured by the number of competing
groups, on the evolutionary selection process of preferences.
Using a notion of local evolutionary stability (Alger and Weibull, 2010), we can explicitly
determine the evolutionarily stable degree to which a group member cares about the material
payo¤ of his/her teammate. Clearly, a given group would be more successful in the group
contest with more in-group altruism. But in the process of evolution, the question arises of
whether a certain degree of altruism within groups is immune against "mutant" members
with lower degrees of altruism. In fact, we show that preference evolution can equally result
in altruism or spite within groups in intergroup conict. Yet, we show that the larger the
degree of complementarity between individual e¤orts or the larger the number of opponents,
the more likely group members are altruistic towards each other. Furthermore, a further
increase in the degree of complementarity between partnerse¤orts or in the intensity of
competition usually tends to reinforces group cohesion in that it increases altruism towards
2This approach has been further developed by, among others, Bester and Güth (1998) and Sethi and
Somanathan (2001). More recently, the literature on the evolution of preferences has focused on the infor-
mational structure in general settings. Heiftez et al. (2007a, 2007b) show that in a large class of games,
agents with "biased" preferences, such as altruism, spite, reciprocity or fairness, may actually be more suc-
cessful in terms of material payo¤ even though agentspreferences are not fully observable. The reason is
that a bias in a players objective function may be favorable by changing other playersequilibrium actions.
However, if preferences are completely unobservable, payo¤-maximization is evolutionary stable (see, e.g.,
Ok and Vega-Redondo, 2001; and Dekel et al., 2007). Alger and Weibull (2013) show that, under incomplete
information, selshness will indeed prevail if there is no assortative matching at all but that, with some
degree of assortativity, preference evolution leads to a certain degree of kantian morality.
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ones partner.
While there are several evolutionary analysis of conicts between single players,3 there
are very few theoretical analysis applying the evolutionary approach to group conicts. In
fact, we are aware of only two papers. The rst one is due to Eaton et al. (2011) who
consider a production and conict model with a large population of players. In each period,
players are randomly matched to form groups of two members and each group competes
for a common access resource with just one other group. After appropriating some of the
common resource, the members of each group can spend some processing e¤orts to produce
a consumption good. While the model is specic, they cannot prove the existence of evolu-
tionarily stable preferences and have to rely on numerical simulations for endogenizing the
preference parameters. The numerical results show that the evolutionary stable parameter
on the payo¤ of ones teammate is positive thus featuring intra-group altruism while that
on the payo¤s of the out-group members is negative thus featuring intergroup spitefulness.4
The other theoretical analysis is due to Konrad and Morath (2012). They consider a
nite population of players with two groups of equal size competing for a prize (or a rent).
Each player cannot observe the preference types of other players and, thus, they introduce
the concept of robust beliefs such that any player with a certain preference type believes that
all other players are of the same type (and have the same robust beliefs). This assumption
greatly simplies the analysis since it eliminates all strategic e¤ects on behaviors of a change
in preference types i.e. a change in the weighs attributed to otherspayo¤s. Konrad and
Morath (2012) then characterize the set of evolutionarily stable preferences, which involve
a linear combination of in-group favoritism and out-group spite with the two traits being
perfect substitutes. Indeed, the utility of each player is itself given by a linear combination
of material payo¤s of all players (including out-group members), while each player exerts
only one level of e¤ort. And this last can be increased by either more in-group altruism or
more spiteful behavior towards the out-group.
Our contribution is that we demonstrate the existence and obtain an analytical solu-
tion for the evolutionary stable preference parameters in a simple model featuring strategic
interactions within and across groups. Furthermore, we explicitly show that as stronger
adversity, as measured by the number of groups competing for the same prize, reinforces
in-group favoritism when group partners perform complementary tasks.
3The evolutionary analysis of contests conict between single players started with Scha¤er (1988) who
adapted the notion of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) by Maynard Smith (1982) to a nite population
of players. Following Scha¤er (1988), Hehenkamp et al. (2004) compare behaviors induced by an ESS
to behaviors in Nash equilibrium and show that an ESS involves spiteful e¤orts in the contest between
individuals. This in turn involves overdissipation of the rent compared to Nash equilibrium. Yet, in an
innite population, ESS behavior coincides to Nash equilibrium behavior. Finally, Leininger (2009) applies
the indirect evolutionary approach to contests between single players and shows that it gives rise to spiteful
preferences that induce the same aggressive behavior than in an ESS.
4In the second part of their paper, they analyze a rent-seeking game for a private prize and for a public
prize with interdependent preferences. However they do not try to endogenize the preference parameters of
the players in this part of the analysis.
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2 The Framework
2.1 A simple group contest game
We consider a large population of players. In each period, players are randomly matched to
form groups of two members playing a group contest game for a common access resource Y
normalized to 2. As in Eaton et al. (2011), group contests are localized and isolated from
each other in that each contest involves a certain number n of groups. The justication is
that the common access resources are situated in geographically identied places.
Let (i; j); for i = f1; 2g and j = f1; 2; :::; ng, denote member i of group j. eij 2 R+ is the
amount of e¤ort expended by player (i; j) and ej = (e1j; e2j) 2 R2+ is the vector of e¤orts
in group j: The e¤ort of group j depends on group memberse¤orts according to an impact
function Gj : R2+  ! R+, which has the CES form, that is
Gj (ej) =

e1j + e

2j
 1
 ; for j = f1; 2; :::; ng ; (1)
where  2 f( 1; 0) [ (0; 1]g measures the degree of complementarity between individual
e¤orts. The elasticity of substitution is 1=(1   ). Thus, the lower , the lower is the
elasticity of substitution or the higher is the degree of complementarity between individual
e¤orts within groups. For  = 1, we have perfect substitutability between individual e¤orts
and Eq. (1) becomes the standard summation technology, i.e. Gj (ej) =
P
i eij. For
  !  1, we have perfect complementarity, i.e. Gj (ej) = Minfeijg (referred as to the
weakest-linkfunction). Finally, for  < 0 and eij = 0, the impact function of group j is
not well-dened. Hence we will take the limit of (1) as eij ! 0, which means Gj (ej) = 0 in
this case.5
Group e¤orts determine the division of the prize. The share allocated to group j is given
by a contest success function pj : Rn+ ! [0; 1], which has the ratio-form6
pj (ej; e j) =
8>>><>>>:
Gj (ej)Pn
k=1Gk (ek)
if
Pn
k=1Gk (ek) 6= 0;
1
n
otherwise,
(2)
where e j = ((e11; e21); :::; (e1j 1; e2j 1); (e1j+1; e2j+1); :::; (e1n; e2n)).
Each member in each group receives an equal amount of the share of the prize of total
value equal to 2  implying that each group member receives a share of a prize of value
Y=2 = 1. In addition, it is assumed that each player incurs a constant marginal cost of
e¤ort. The material payo¤ to member (i; j), for i = f1; 2g and j = f1; 2; :::; ng ; is given by
an additively separable function ij : R+  [0; 1]! R+, that is
ij (ej; e j) = pj (ej; e j)  eij. (3)
5Note that (1) is also discontinuous at  = 0. This case is excluded from our analysis.
6For an axiomatization of group contest success functions, see Munster (2009). And for a rather complete
analysis of group contests but without other-regarding preferences  where the impact function is given
by a CES technology, see Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013).
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2.2 Preference interdependence
Let consider that each player has a utility that depend not only on his/her own material
payo¤ but also on that of his/her teammate. The utility of member (i; j), for i = f1; 2g and
j = f1; 2; :::; ng ; is also given by an additively separable function Vij : R2+ ! R+, that is
Vij (ej; e j) = ij (ej; e j) + ij ij (ej; e j) , (4)
where the subscript  ij stands for the member other than i in team j: ij 2 ( 1; R], with
R  1 and for i = f1; 2g and j = f1; 2; :::ng, is the utility weight given by member i in group
j to the material payo¤ of his/her teammate with positive values representing "altruism"
and negative values representing "spite".7 Let  2 ( 1; R]2n be the vector of preference
parameters in a localized contest that involves n groups of two members.
In contrast to Eaton et al. (2011) and Konrad and Morath (2012), the utility of a player
does not depend presumably negatively on the material payo¤s of out-group members.
Again, in a simple rent-seeking game, this is not a restrictive assumption since players exert
just one level of e¤ort and this last could increase with either more in-group altruism or
more spiteful behavior towards out-group members. Hence, player (i; j), for i = f1; 2g and
j = f1; 2; :::; ng chooses his e¤ort level eij so as to maximize his utility given by (4), which
can be rewritten with (3) as
Vij (ej; e j) = (1 + ij)pj (ej; e j)  (eij + ije ij): (5)
We have the following Lemma.8
Lemma 1: (i) Given  2 ( 1; R]2n, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In
equilibrium, the e¤ort of player (i; j) is characterized for i = f1; 2g and j = f1; 2; :::; ng by
the following rst-order condition
(1 + ij)
pj (ej; e j) [1  pj (ej; e j)]
e1 ij (e

ij + e

 ij)
 1 with equality for eij > 0; (6)
(ii) In any equilibrium, a given group j is either fully active i.e. eij > 0 for i = f1; 2g or
fully inactive i.e. eij = 0 for i = f1; 2g.
The proof consists in three steps. We rst show that Vij (ej; e j) is strictly concave in eij
so that the rst-order condition (6) is necessary and su¢ cient for characterizing the best-
response function of player (i; j). Next, we show that there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which a corner solution holds for a member of one group while an interior solution holds for
the other member of the same group (property (ii)). This important property allows us to
reduce the group contest to a lottery contest between individual players with heterogeneous
preferences and then use the existence theorems of Cornes and Hartley (2005). It is also
worth pointing out that when  < 0, there are multiple equilibria since if player (i; j) chooses
7We exclude the case ij   1 since then it would prevent positive levels of e¤orts. However, degrees of
altruism ij  1 may exist, for instance, between biological parents or couples.
8All the proofs are given in the Appendix.
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eij = 0, then Gj (ej) = 0 and thus player ( i; j) cannot do better than choosing e ij = 0.
In other words, the members of a given group can "coordinate" on participating or not
participating to the group contest when  < 0 (see also, Kolmar and Rommeswinkel, 2013).9
Suppose now that all players in the population except one player, whom we will call the
mutant, have a certain degree of altruism  2 ( 1; R] towards their teammates. Without loss
of generality, let assume that the mutant is player (1; 1) i.e. the member 1 of group 1 and
let m 2 ( 1; R] be his/her degree of altruism/spitefulness. These weights are exogenous to
the players.
The mutant with the preference parameter m chooses e11 so as to maximize his/her
utility given by
V11 (e1; e 1) = (1 + m)p1 (e1; e 1)  (e11 + me21): (5)
Member 2 of group 1, with the preference parameter , chooses e21 so as to maximize his/her
utility given by
V21 (e1; e 1) = (1 + )p1 (e1; e 1)  (e21 + e11). (6)
Finally, the utility of all other players are symmetric since they all belong to a group where
the two members have the same preference parameter . Thus, player (i; j), for i = f1; 2g
and j = f2; 3; :::; ng, chooses eij to maximize his/her utility given by
Vij (ej; e j) = (1 + )pj (ej; e j)  (eij + e ij). (7)
There are thus three distinct equilibrium e¤ort levels that must satisfy the rst order con-
ditions for the two members of group 1 and the rst-order condition for one member of any
other group than group 1.
We have the following Proposition.
Proposition 1: Let (m; ) = (1 + m)

1  +(1 + )

1  where m 2 ( 1; R] is the prefer-
ence parameter of the mutant and where  2 ( 1; R] is the incumbent preference parameter,
then:
(i) There exists a unique interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium with eij > 0 for all i and j
if and only if 
(m; )
2
 1 

 (n  2)(1 + )
(n  1) ; (8)
(ii) If (8) holds, equilibrium e¤ort levels are given by
e11 (m; ) =
2
1 
 (n  1)(1 + )(1 + m) 11  [(n  1) [ (m; )]
1 
   2 1  (n  2)(1 + )]
 (m; ) [2
1 
 (1 + ) + (n  1) [ (m; )]
1 
 ]2
;
e21 (m; ) =
2
1 
 (n  1)(1 + ) 2 1  [(n  1) [ (m; )]
1 
   2 1  (n  2)(1 + )]
 (m; ) [2
1 
 (1 + ) + (n  1) [ (m; )]
1 
 ]2
;
eij (m; ) =
2
1 
 (n  1) (1 + )2 [ (m; )]
1 

2[2
1 
 (1 + ) + (n  1) [ (m; )]
1 
 ]2
for i = f1; 2g and j = f2; :::; ng : (9)
9Thus, there also exists the corner equilibrium that we ignore with eij = 0 for all i and j:
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As shown in the proof of this Proposition, there are two types of equilibrium (excluding
those in which group members "coordinate" on not participating when  < 0): either all
groups are fully active or group 1 is the only inactive group. Observe that the inequality
(8) is always veried for m =  and that its left-hand term is increasing in m. Therefore,
the inequality is always veried for m  . If however, given  and n, m is su¢ ciently
small relative to  so that the inequality (8) is reversed then, in equilibrium, the group with
the mutant member is fully inactive because the utility weight given by the mutant to the
material payo¤ of his/her partner is relatively too small (and potentially negative).
Suppose that (8) holds, then the material payo¤or tness of player (i; j) for i = f1; 2g
and j = f1; 2; 3; :::; ng, is
ij (m; ) = pj
 
ej (m; ) ; e

 j (m; )
  eij (m; ) . (10)
3 Evolutionarily Stable Preferences
To study the evolutionarily stability of altruism or spitefulness, we employ the indirect evo-
lutionary approach pioneered by Güth and Yaari (1992). All players choose e¤ort levels that
maximize their utility and evolution pressure ensures the survival of preferencesparameters
that induce equilibrium behavior providing the highest levels of material payo¤.
Initially, all players have the same preference parameter  and the question is whether this
preference parameter is immune against invading mutant players with a preference parameter
m. Suppose a mutant is selected to play a n-group contest game as member 1 of group 1.
The preference parameter  is said to be evolutionarily stable if 11 (; ) > 

11 (m; ) for
all m 6= . In other words, a degree of altruism  is evolutionary stable if 11 (m; ) reaches
its unique global maximum in m = . Unfortunately, we will not be able to verify global
stability or that the above inequality holds for all m 6= . Hence, following Alger and
Weibull (2010), we use the concept of local stability.
Denition 1 (Alger and Weibull, 2010): A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a
degree of altruism/spitefulness  2 ( 1; R] to be locally evolutionarily stable is (i)-(ii) where
(i)
@11 (m; 
)
@m
jm= = 0;
(ii)
@211 (m; 
)
@2m
jm= < 0:
In other words,  is locally evolutionarily stable if and only if 11 (m; 
) has a strict local
maximum in m = 
.
We have the following Proposition.
Proposition 2: If   , then there exists a unique locally evolutionarily stable preference
parameter  2 ( 1; R] given by
 =
(n2   2)(1  )  n
(n2 + 2)(1  )  n(1  2) : (11)
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and where
 =
2n3 + 3n2   6n+ 4  np4n3(n  1) + 17n2   20n+ 12
4(n  1)2 ; (12)
which is increasing in n over

5  3p2; 1.
Recall that the lower , the greater is the complementarity between group memberscontri-
butions. Thus, there may not exist stable evolutionary preferences if individual contributions
are too substitutable. The limit value of  is nevertheless increasing in the number of com-
peting groups. It reaches a minimum in n = 2 in which case  jn=2 = 5   3
p
2  0:76 and
approaches 1 as n is going to innity.
From this Proposition, we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 1: (i)  T 0 for  S ^ where ^ = (n2   n  2) =(n2   2); (ii) ^ is increasing
in n over [0; 1).
Corollary 1 states that  can be positive featuring altruism or negative featuring spite
depending on the degree of complementarity between individual e¤orts within groups and
on the number of groups competing against each other.10 Indeed, a crucial feature of the
contest game is that individual tness is determined by the probability of success of the
group and this last has the characteristics of a public good. Thus, increasing ones own
contribution to group e¤ort above the level corresponding to selsh behavior as a result
for example of altruism can be advantageous vis-à-vis the players of the other groups but
can also be detrimental vis-à-vis ones teammate because it could induce him/her to free-
ride on ones own additional e¤ort. Therefore, it is not clear whether altruism or spiteful
behavior is more successful in terms of individual tness. This depends on the technology
for aggregating individual e¤orts into group e¤ort and on the number of groups competing
against each other for the resource.
Yet, if the degree of the complementarity between individual e¤orts  is su¢ ciently
strong i.e.   ^ then evolution leads towards intra-group altruism. Furthermore, the
requirement about the degree of complementarity becomes less stringent as the number of
competing groups increases. Indeed ^ is increasing in n, reaches a minimum in n = 2 in
which case ^ jn=2 = 0, and approaches 1 as the number of groups competing against each
other is going to innity. As a result, preference evolution leads to intra-group altruism for
any  < 0 independently of the number of competing groups and, in the limit, when the
number of competing groups becomes very large, preference evolution leads to intra-group
altruism for any   1:
We can also determine how  changes with the degree of complementarity  between
individual e¤orts. The derivative of  with respect to  is given by
@
@
=   2n
2(n  1)
[(n2 + 2)(1  )  n(1  2)]2 : (13)
We thus have the following Proposition.
10Since ^ <  for any n  2,   0 can indeed be locally evolutionarily stable. One can also easily verify
that  given by (11) is also strictly greater than  1.
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Proposition 3: The higher the degree of complementarity between individual e¤orts  i.e.
the lower  the lower is the degree of spitefulness or the higher is the degree of altruism 
i.e. the higher is .
As already stated, the degree of complementarity  must be su¢ ciently strong i.e.   ^ 
for a positive degree of in-group altruism to be (locally) evolutionarily stable. In any case, an
increase in the degree of complementarity between partnerse¤orts reinforces group cohesion
in that it decreases spitefulness or increases altruism towards ones partner. Intuitively,
higher degrees of complementarity make group e¤ort and in turn the probability of success of
a given group more sensitive to individual e¤ort. As a result, "free-riding" on the contribution
of ones teammate becomes detrimental to group success and in turn to individual tness as
the degree of complementarity increases.
There remains the question as to whether a larger number of competing groups increases
the degree of intra-group altruism (or decreases the degree of intra-group spitefulness). Cal-
culating the derivative of  with respect to n, we obtain
@
@n
=
2(1  ) [2(2n  1) + (n2   4n+ 2)]
[(n2 + 2)(1  )  n(1  2)]2 : (14)
One can observe that this derivative is always positive for any  > 0 while its sign is am-
biguous for  < 0. We can thus state the following Proposition.
Proposition 4: (i)When  > 0, the evolutionarily stable preference parameter  is increas-
ing in n and becomes positive from n  ~n where ~n =
h
1 +
p
9  8(2  )
i
= [2(1  )]; (ii)
When  < 0, the evolutionarily stable preference parameter  is not monotonous in n, but
it is always positive.
When the degree of complementarity between individual e¤orts is relatively low i.e. when
 > 0 preference evolution can lead to spitefulness within groups if few groups compete
against each other. However, as the number of groups increases, it leads to the emergence
of in-group altruism and this behavioral trait becomes increasingly strong as the number of
competing groups keeps going up (property (i) of Proposition 4). This result echoes that of
an increase in the degree of complementarity between individual e¤orts. When the intensity
of the conict between groups increases, the success of ones own group is becoming more and
more decisive for the evolutionary success of a group member. In other words, the intensity
of the conict helps solving the tendency to "free-riding" or selshness by developing
in-group favoritism. When the degree of within-group complementarities is relatively large
 i.e. when  < 0 preference evolution leads to in-group altruism independently of the
number of groups. Yet, in this case, a larger number of competing groups can increase as
well as decrease the evolutionary stable degree of altruism within groups (property (ii) of
Proposition 4). It remains that  < 0 always leads to a stronger degree of in-group altruism
than  > 0 for any given number of competing groups (Proposition 3).
Finally, we can characterize equilibrium levels of e¤orts and of individual tness when
players have locally evolutionarily stable preferences. When all players in society have the
same preference parameter , they all exert the same level of individual e¤ort i.e. using
10
(9) e = (1+ )(n  1)=2n2. Substituting  given by (11) into this expression, we obtain
e =
(1  ) (n  1)2
n [(n2 + 2)(1  )  n(1  2)] : (15)
Furthermore, all groups have the same probability of success i.e. 1=n, so that each players
material payo¤ induced by evolutionarily stable preferences is  = (1=n)  e or
 =
n+ 1  
n [(n2 + 2)(1  )  n(1  2)] : (16)
It can be easily veried that an increase in the degree of complementarity between individual
e¤orts i.e. a decrease in  unambiguously decreases material payo¤. Indeed, the lower
 the higher is the evolutionarily stable level of in-group altruism and thus the higher the
level of individual e¤ort. As a result, the conict becomes more severe. A larger number of
competing groups has an ambiguous impact on the evolutionarily stable preference parameter
and thus on equilibrium levels of e¤orts. Yet, a larger number of groups also unambiguously
decreases individual payo¤s simply because a larger number of players are involved in the
conict for a resource of a xed amount.
4 Conclusion
The inclination of people to pull together in face of a common enemy appears to be a
universal trait of human behavior and this is conrmed by several experimental studies in
economics or social psychology. In this paper, we provide an evolutionary foundation for the
emergence and stability of parochialaltruism in a context where several groups compete
against each other for an exogenous resource. It is shown that both a strong degree of
complementarity between individual e¤orts and a large number of competing groups reinforce
in-group favoritism. Indeed, the success of a group crucially depends on its ability to contain
the tendency to free-riding or selshness. There is thus an evolutionary pressure towards
in-group altruism because it increases the probability of success of the group in the conict,
which in turn increases individual tness. The downside of this behavior is that it makes
the conict between groups more severe and potentially more destructive. A fundamental
reason for this is that there is a xed amount of resources at the origin of the conict. Thus,
it would be interesting to try to extend the analysis to a model where players have some
endowments for example units of time that can be used for production or for rent-seeking.
However, the present analysis shows that the existence and characterization of evolutionarily
stable preferences can be very challenging even in a very simple framework.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of this Lemma is conducted in three steps. The rst one is to show that the rst-order
conditions given by (6) are necessary and su¢ cient for maximization.
The rst derivative of Vij(ej; e j), given by (5), with respect to eij is given by
@Vij(ej; e j)
@eij
= (1 + ij)
@pj (ej; e j)
@Gj (ej)
@Gj (ej)
@eij
  1: (A1)
Using (1) and (2), we have
@pj (ej; e j)
@Gj (ej)
=
P
k 6=j Gk (ek)
(
Pn
l=1Gl (el))
2 ; (A2)
and
@Gj (ej)
@eij
=

eij + e

 ij
 1

 1
e 1ij =
Gj (ej) e
 1
ij
eij + e

 ij
: (A3)
Thus (A1) can be rewritten as
(1 + ij)
pj (ej; e j)
hP
k 6=j pk (ek; e k)
i
e 1ij 
eij + e

 ij
   1: (A4)
As a result, the rst-order condition for i = f1; 2g and j = f1; 2; :::; ng is given by (6) since
pj (ej; e j) +
P
k 6=j pk (ek; e k) = 1.
The second derivative of Vij(ej; e j) with respect to eij is given by
@2Vij(ej; e j)
@e2ij
= (1 + ij)
8>>>>><>>>>>:
[1  2pj (ej; e j)] @pj (ej; e j)
@Gj (e1)
@Gj (ej)
@eij
e 1ij 
eij + e

 ij

pj (ej; e j) [1  pj (ej; e j)]
e 2ij

(   1) e ij   eij
 
eij + e

 ij
2
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
: (A5)
From (A2) and (A3), we also have
@pj (ej; e j)
@Gj (ej)
@Gj (ej)
@eij
=
pj (ej; e j) [1  pj (ej; e j)] e 1ij
eij + e

 ij
: (A6)
Substituting (A6) into (A5), we obtain
@2Vij(ej; e j)
@e2ij
=
(1 + ij)pj (ej; e j) [1  pj (ej; e j)]
 2pj (ej; e j) eij + (   1) e ij e 2ij 
eij + e

 ij
2 ;
(A7)
which is always negative for i = f1; 2gand j = f1; 2; :::; ng since   1.
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As a result Vij(ej; e j), for i = f1; 2gand j = f1; 2; :::; ng, is strictly concave and continuous
in eij for  2 ( 1; 0) or  2 (0; 1]. Thus, the rst-order condition given by (6) is both necessary
and su¢ cient for characterizing the best-response function of player (i; j) for i = f1; 2gand j =
f1; 2; :::; ng :
The second step of the proof is to show that if a group participates to the contest, then its
two members produce positive levels of e¤ort. In other words, a corner solution for player (i; j) 
that is eij = 0 and an interior solution for player ( i; j) that is e ij > 0 cannot be mutual
best responses for the two players of group j. Indeed, suppose rst that  2 (0; 1] with eij = 0
and e ij > 0, then we would have pj (ej; e j) > 0 but the denominator of the LHT of (6) would
tend to 0, so that the LHT would approach innity. Hence, (6) cannot be satised for eij = 0
and e ij > 0 when  2 (0; 1]. Now suppose that  2 ( 1; 0) with eij = 0; then Gj (ej) = 0
and thus V ij(ej; e j) is strictly decreasing in e ij so that player ( i; j) cannot do better than
e ij = 0 in this case. To conclude, if a group participates to the contest it fully participates
with both members being active (see also Kolmar and Rommeswinkel, 2003). Furthermore, there
cannot exist an equilibrium where all groups do not participate to the contest for  2 (0; 1].
Indeed, if all other groups do not enter the contest, the members of group j could win the prize
with probability 1 in return for an arbitrarily small e¤ort (exerted by both group members). As a
result for  2 (0; 1], at least one group is fully active. If  2 ( 1; 0), eij = 0 and e ij = 0 are
mutually best responses independently of the behavior of other groups. Hence, there may exist an
equilibrium in which none the n groups participate to the contest.
The nal step for demonstrating the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium characterized
by (6), is to reduce the group contest to a contest among individual players11 and then use Theorem
1 of Cornes and Hartley (2005). Suppose that there are m active groups and consider the system
of 2m rst-order conditions (6) holding with equality. This system can be rewritten as (with (A1),
(A2) and (A3)) P
k 6=j Gk

G1 j P
l2M Gl
2 = e1 ij(1 + ij) ; (A8)
for i = f1; 2gand j being an element of the set of active groups denoted by M .
For a given group j, the LHS of (A8) is the same for i = f1; 2gand hence e1j(1+ 2j)1=(1 ) =
(1 + 1j)
1=(1 ) e2j . The aggregate output of group j 2 M can thus be written as a function of
the e¤ort of player 1, that is
Gj =
"
(1 + 1j)

1  + (1 + 2j)

1 
(1 + 1j)

1 
# 1

e1j  	1j(1j; 2j)e1j: (A9)
We thus have e1j = [	1j(1j; 2j)]
 1Gj .
The system of of 2m rst-order conditions (A8) can thus be reduced to a system ofm equations
in Gj for j = f1; 2; :::;mg, that is P
k 6=j Gk P
l2M Gl
2 = 1j(1j; 2j) ; (A10)
11See also Brookins et al. (2015) in a model of group contest with CES impact functions and heterogeneous
and convex cost functions.
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where
j(1j; 2j) = (1 + 1j) [	1j(1j; 2j)]
1  =
h
(1 + 1j)

1  + (1 + 2j)

1 
i 1 

: (A11)
In other words, the system of rst-order conditions (A4) for the group contest with heterogeneous
(other-regarding) preferences can be reduced to a system that is induced by a lottery contest of m
individual players choosing Gj with heterogeneous (and constant) marginal costs given by the RHT
of (A10). Applying Theorem 1 of Cornes and Hartley (2005), we can conclude that there exists a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium Gj for j 2 M . In turn, eij = [	1j(1j; 2j)] 1Gj for i = f1; 2g
and j 2M satisfying (6) constitute an equilibrium in the contest between groups.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that if a group participates to the contest, then its
two members produce positive levels of e¤ort. Furthermore, the group contest with heterogeneous
"other-regarding" preferences can be reduced to a lottery contest between individual players choos-
ing Gj with heterogeneous marginal costs. Let G =
P
kGk. From (A10), the rst-order condition
for player j can be rewritten as
G Gj
G2
  1
j(1j; 2j)
 0: (A12)
It is non-positive at Gj = 0 for j(1j; 2j)  G. Thus player/group j is fully inactive if
j(1j; 2j)  G. If, however j(1j; 2j) > G, then player j is active and thus Gj = G  
(G2=j(1j; 2j)). Again, let M be the set of the m active players in equilibrium. We have
G =
P
j2M Gj , and hence
G =
m  1P
j2M (1=j(1j; 2j))
. (A13)
Suppose now that all group members have the same preference parameter  except group member
(1; 1) with the preference parameter m. We thus have (from (A11))  1() = 2
1 
 (1 + ) for
all j 6= 1 and 1(m; ) =
h
(1 + m)

1  + (1 + )

1 
i 1 

. We rst show that there cannot exist
an equilibrium in which player (i.e. group) 1 with marginal cost 1=1(m; ) is active and some
x > 1 but not all i.e. x < n   1 other players (i.e. groups) with the common marginal cost
1= 1() are inactive. If it were the case, we would have
G =
n  x  1
[1=1(m; )] + (n  x  1) [1= 1()] =
(n  x  1)1(m; ) 1()
(n  x  1)1(m; ) +  1() : (A14)
But for a player j 6= 1 to be inactive, we must also have  1()  G which is in contradiction
with (A14). As a result, there are two possibilities. All groups j 6= 1 are either fully active or
fully inactive. However, there cannot exist an equilibrium where all these groups are fully inactive
while group 1 is fully active. Indeed, in that case, we would have that the LHT of (A12) is strictly
negative for any positive level of G1 > 0 so that this group would not play its best response. As a
consequence, if player (i.e. group) 1 is active, then all players (groups) are active in equilibrium.
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Now, suppose player 1 is fully inactive while some x > 1 but not all i.e. x < n   1 other
players are also fully inactive. In this case, we would have
G =
(n  x  2) 1()
(n  x  1) : (A15)
But again for a player j 6= 1 to be inactive, we must also have  1()  G which is in contradiction
with (A15). Thus when player 1 is fully inactive, All groups j 6= 1 are either fully active or fully
inactive. As stated in footnote 9, we ignore the equilibrium where all groups are fully inactive.
Thus, suppose that all players j 6= 1 are fully active (still with player 1 being active). In this case,
G is given by (A15) with x = 0. This is an equilibrium if 1(m; )  G, or
1(m; )
 1()
 (n  2)
(n  1) . (A16)
To conclude there are two types of equilibrium. If (A16) holds, group 1 is fully inactive while all
other groups are active. If (A16) does not hold, then all groups are fully active. Let dene
(m; ) = (1 + m)

1  + (1 + )

1  ; (A17)
so that 1(m; ) = [ (m; )]
1 
 . Since  1() = 2
1 
 (1 + ), the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for all groups being active is given by (8).
(ii) Suppose (8) holds. If ij =  for i = f1; 2g and j = f2; :::; ng, then rst-order conditions
given by (6) are symmetric for all j 6= 1 and thus all players except the members of group 1 exert
the same level of individual e¤ort that we denote eij = eS for i = f1; 2g and j = f2; 3; :::; ng : As a
result pj (ej; e j) = pS (e1; e 1) for all j = f2; 3; :::; ng and where e 1 = ((eS; eS); :::; (eS; eS))| {z }
n 1 times
:
The two members of group 1 di¤er in terms of (other-regarding) preferences and thus will
exert di¤erent levels of e¤orts in equilibrium. This gives rise to a probability of success for group
1, i.e. p1 (e1; e 1), that di¤ers from pS (e1; e 1).
From these observations, there are three distinct equilibrium levels of e¤ort that must satisfy
the following rst-order conditions,
(1 + m)
p1 (e1; e 1) [(n  1)pS (e1; e 1)] e 111
e11 + e

21
= 1; (A18)
for the mutant player (1; 1), and
(1 + )
p1 (e1; e 1) [(n  1)pS (e1; e 1)] e 121
e11 + e

21
= 1; (A19)
for player (2; 1) who is the partner of the mutant in group 1, and
(1 + )
pS (e1; e 1) [p1 (e1; e 1) + (n  2)pS (e1; e 1)]
2eS
= 1; (A20)
for all players (i; j), for i = f1; 2gand j = f2; :::; ng.
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Thus, using (A18) and (A19), we have
e21 =

1 + 
1 + m
 1
1 
e11: (A21)
With (A19) and (A20), we have
2eSp1 (e1; e 1) (n  1)e 121 = [p1 (e1; e 1) + (n  2)pS (e1; e 1)] (e11 + e21) : (A22)
Using (1) and (2) and the fact that Gj (ej) = GS (eS) = 21=eS for j = f2; 3; :::; ng and that
p1 (e1; e 1) and pS (e1; e 1) have the same numerator, (A22) becomes
eS

2G1 (e1) (n  1)e 121   21=(n  2) (e11 + e21)

= G1 (e1) (e

11 + e

21) : (A23)
Since G1 (e1) = (e11 + e

21)
1=, (A23) can be rewritten as
eS
h
2(n  1)e 121   21=(n  2) (e11 + e21)( 1)=
i
= (e11 + e

21) : (A24)
Let
(:)  (m; ) = (1 + m)

1  + (1 + )

1  : (A25)
Then, using (A11) and (A13), (A14) can be rewritten has
eS
h
2(n  1) [ (:)] 1    2 1 (1 + ) (n  2)
i
(1 + m)
1
1  = (1 + ) [ (:)]
1
 e11: (A26)
The rst-order condition (A18) can also be rewritten as
(1 + m) (n  1)G1 (e1)GS (eS) e 111
(e11 + e

21) [G1 (e1) + (n  1)GS (eS)]2
  1 = 0: (A27)
Since GS (eS) = 21=eS and G1 (e1) = (e11 + e

21)
1=, (A27) can be rewritten as
2
1
 (n  1)(1 + m) (e11 + e21)
1 
 e 111 eS =
h
(e11 + e

21)
1
 + 2
1
 (n  1)eS
i2
(A28)
Using (A21) and (A25), (A28) becomes
2
1
 (n  1)(1 + m) 21  [ (:)]
1 
 eS =
h
[ (:)]
1
 e11 + 2
1
 (n  1)(1 + m) 11  eS
i2
(A29)
Substituting eS given by (A26) into (A29), we nd after some tedious rearrangements, the equilib-
rium level of e¤ort e11 (m; ) by the mutant agent 1 of group 1 given in (9). The equilibrium
level of e¤ort e21 (m; ) by the mutants partner is obtained by using (A21). Finally, the common
equilibrium level of e¤ort for any player i = f1; 2g of group j, for j = f2; 3; ::ng, that is eij (m; )
in (9) is obtained by substituting e11 (m; ) into (A26).
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5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We rst determine condition (i) of Denition 1. We have
@11
@m
=
@p1
 
e1; e

 1

@G1 (e1)

@G1 (e

1)
@e11
@e11
@m
+
@G1 (e

1)
@e21
@e21
@m

+
X
j 6=1
@p1
 
e1; e

 1

@Gj(ej)

@Gj(e

j)
@e1j
@e1j
@m
+
@Gj(e

j)
@e2j
@e2j
@m

  @e

11
@m
. (A30)
Using the rst-order conditions for the e¤ort levels of the two members of group 1, that is (A1)
with 11 = m and 21 = , we have
@11
@m
=   m
1 + m
@e11
@m
+
1
1 + 
@e21
@m
+
X
j 6=1
@p1
 
e1; e

 1

@Gj(ej)

@Gj(e

j)
@e1j
@e1j
@m
+
@Gj(e

j)
@e2j
@e2j
@m

: (A31)
We have
@p1
 
e1; e

 1

@Gj(ej)
=   G1 (e

1)h
G1 (e1) +
P
j 6=1Gj(e

j)
i2 for j 6= 1: (A32)
From (A3), we also have
@Gj(e

j)
@eij
=

(eij)
 + (e ij)

 1 
 (eij)
 1: (A33)
Since eij = e

S for i = f1; 2g and j 6= 1, we have Gj(ej) = GS (eS) and @Gj(ej)=@eij = 2(1 )=
for i = f1; 2g and j 6= 1 and thus (A31) reduces to
@11
@m
=   m
1 + m
@e11
@m
+
1
1 + 
@e21
@m
  2
1=(n  1)G1 (e1)
[G1 (e1) + (n  1)GS (eS)]2
@eS
@m
: (A34)
We now evaluate this expression at m = .
Recall rst that e21 = [(1 + )=(1 + m)]
1
1  e11. Therefore, the derivative of e

21 with respect
to m is thus given by
@e21
@m
=

1 + 
1 + m
 1
1 

  e

11
(1  )(1 + m) +
@e11
@m

; (A35)
and hence,
@e21
@m
jm= =  
e
(1  )(1 + ) +
@e11
m
jm= ; (A36)
since at m = , we have e11 = e

21 = e

S = e
:
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Also using (9), the derivative of eS with respect to m is given (after tedious calculations and
rearrangements) by
@eS
@m
=
2
1 
 (n  1) (1 + )2 [ (:)] 1 2 [2 1  (1 + )  (n  1) [ (:)] 1  ]
2 (1 + m)
1 2
1  [2
1 
 (1 + ) + (n  1) [ (:)] 1  ]3
; (A37)
and hence
@eS
@m
jm= =  
(n  2)(n  1)
4n3
: (A38)
Substituting (A38) and (A36) into (A34), we have
@11
@m
jm= =
1  
1 + 
@e11
@m
jm=  
e
(1  )(1 + )2 +
(n  1)2(n  2)
4n5e
; (A39)
since G1 (e1) = GS (e

S) = 2
1
 e.
Using (9), we also have
e =
(1 + )(n  1)
2n2
: (A40)
Substituting (A40) into (A39), one obtain
@11
@m
jm= =
1  
1 + 
@e11
@m
jm=  
(n  1) [(n  2) + 2]
2n3(1  )(1 + ) : (A41)
Also, after long and tedious calculations, we obtain
@e11
@m
=
2
1 
 (n  1)(1 + )(1 + m) 1  [ 1(:) +  2(:) +  3(:)]
(1  ) [ (:)]2
h
2
1 
 (1 + ) + (n  1) [ (:)] 1 
i3 where
 1(:)   1 (m; ) =  4 1  (n  2)(1 + )2
h
(:)  (1 + m) 1 
i
;
 2(:)   2 (m; ) = (n  1)2 [ (:)]
2(1 )

h
(:)  (1 + m) 1 
i
;
(A42)
 3(:)   3 (m; ) =  2 1  (n  1)(1 + ) [ (:)]
1 

h
(n  3) (:)  [n(2  )  3] (1 + m) 1 
i
:
Therefore, we have
@e11
@m
jm= =
(n  1) (n  1)2   (n  2)(2  )  (n  1) (n  3)
4(1  )n3 : (A43)
Substituting into (A41) and setting it to 0 yields a unique value for  given by (11). One can also
easily verify that    1, since this inequality reduces to n   =(1  ), which holds for any
 2 f( 1; 0) [ (0; 1]g.
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We now verify condition (ii) of Denition 1. (A34) can be rewritten as
@11
@m
= 1(:) + 2(:) + 3(:) where
1(:)  1 (m; ) =   m
1 + m
@e11
@m
;
2(:)  2 (m; ) = 1
1 + 
@e21
@m
;
3(:)  3 (m; ) =  2
1=(n  1)G1 (e1)
[G1 (e1) + (n  1)GS (eS)]2
@eS
@m
: (A44)
We have
@1(:)
@m
=   1
(1 + m)
2
@e11
@m
  m
1 + m
@2e11
@2m
: (A45)
Now, let evaluate this expression at m = . We have
@1(:)
@m
jm= =  
1
(1 + )2
@e11
@m
jm=  

1 + 
@2e11
@2m
jm= : (A46)
We also have
@2(:)
@m
=
1
1 + 
@2e21
@2m
: (A47)
Using (A35), the second derivative of e21 with respect to m is given by
@2e21
@2m
=

1 + 
1 + m
 1
1 

  2
(1  )(1 + m)
@e11
@m
+
(2  )e11
(1  )2(1 + m)2 +
@2e11
@2m

: (A48)
Substituting (A48) into (A47) and evaluating this last expression at m = , we obtain
@2(:)
@m
jm= =
1
1 + 

  2
(1  )(1 + )
@e11
@m
jm= +
(2  )e
(1  )2(1 + )2 +
@2e11
@2m
jm=

:
(A49)
Recalling that e = (1 + )(n  1)=2n2, using (A46) and (A49) we obtain
@ (1(:) + 2(:))
@m
jm= =
(2  )(n  1)
2n2(1  )2(1 + )2  
(3  )
(1  )(1 + )2
@e11
@m
jm=
+

1  
1 + 

@2e11
@2m
jm= : (A50)
Substituting (A43) into (A50), we have
@ (1(:) + 2(:))
@m
jm= =  
(n  1) [3n2   7n+ 6  (n2   2n+ 2)]
4n3(1  )(1 + )2 +

1  
1 + 

@2e11
@2m
jm= :
(A51)
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We now calculate the derivative of 3 (:) with respect to m. From (A44), 3 (:) can be rewritten
as
3(:) =  21=(n  1)p1 (e1; eS) (e1; eS)
@eS
@m
where
(e1; e

S) =
1
G1 (e1) + (n  1)GS (eS)
: (A52)
We have
@3(:)
@m
=  21=(n  1)
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
@p1(:)
@m
@eS
@m
(:) + p1(:)(:)
@2eS
@2m
+p1(:)
@eS
@m
266664
@(:)
@G1(:)

@G1(:)
@e11
@e11
@m
+
@G1(:)
@e21
@e21
@m

+
@(:)
@GS(:)
@GS(:)
@eS
@eS
@m
377775
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
: (A53)
We have
@(:)
@GS(:)
= (n  1) @(:)
@G1(:)
=   n  1
[G1 (:) + (n  1)GS (:)]2
: (A54)
Furthermore, from the rst-order condition (A30), we have @p1(:)=@m = @e11=@m. Thus (A53)
becomes
Thus (A44) becomes
@3
@m
=  21=(n  1)
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
@e11
@m
@eS
@m
(:) + p1(:)(:)
@2eS
@2m
+p1(:)
@eS
@m
@(:)
@G1(:)
266664
@G1(:)
@e11
@e11
@m
+
@G1(:)
@e21
@e21
@m
+(n  1)@GS(:)
@eS
@eS
@m
377775
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
: (A55)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
p1(:) jm= =
1
n
; (:) jm= =
1
2
1
ne
;
@(:)
@G1(:)
jm= =  
1
[nG(e)]2
=   1h
2
1
ne
i2 ;
@GS(:)
@eS
jm= = 2
1
 ;
@G1(:)
@e11
jm= =
@G1(:)
@e21
jm= = 2
1 
 : (A56)
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As a result, we have
@3(:)
@m
jm= =  
(n  1)
ne
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:

@e11
@m
@eS
@m

jm= +
1
n
@2eS
@2m
jm=
  1
2n2e
@eS
@m
jm=
26664
@e11
@m
jm= +
@e21
@m
jm=
+2(n  1) @e

S
@m
jm=
37775
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
: (A57)
From (A35), we have
@e21
@m
jm= =  
e
(1  )(1 + ) +
@e11
@m
jm= : (A58)
Substituting (A58) into (A57), we obtain
@3(:)
@m
jm= =  
(n  1)
ne
@eS
@m
jm=
8>>>><>>>>:

1  1
n2e

@e11
@m
jm=
+
1
2n2(1  )(1 + )  
(n  1)
n2e
@eS
@m
jm=
9>>>>=>>>>;
 (n  1)
n2e
@2eS
@2m
jm= : (A59)
Substituting e given by (A40) into (A59), one obtain
@3(:)
@m
jm= =  
2n
(1 + )
@eS
@m
jm=
8>>>><>>>>:

(1 + )(n  1)  2
(1 + )(n  1)

@e11
@m
jm=
+
1
2n2(1  )(1 + )  
2
(1 + )
@eS
@m
jm=
9>>>>=>>>>;
  2
(1 + )
@2eS
@2m
jm= : (A60)
Substituting (A38) and (A43) into (A60), we obtain after some trivial (but tedious) calculations
@3(:)
@m
jm= =
(n  1)(n  2)
24 (n3   2)(1  )(1 + )  n2(2  3)(1 + )
+n(1  2 + (3  4))
35
8(1  )(1 + )2n5
  2
(1 + )
@2eS
@2m
jm= : (A61)
The second derivative of 11 (m; ) with respect to m evaluated at m =  is given by the sum
of (A51) and (A61).
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What remains to be done is the calculation of the second derivative of e11 and of e

S with respect
to m. Calculating the derivative of @e11=@m given by (A42) with respect to m and evaluating
the resulting expression at m = , we obtain12
@2e11
@2m
jm= =  
(n  1) [n3   5n2 + 10n  6  2(2n3   6n2 + 8n  3)]
8(1  ) (1 + )n4 : (A62)
Similarly, calculating the derivative of @eS=@m given by (A37) with respect to m and evaluating
the resulting expression at m = , we obtain
@2eS
@2m
jm= =
(n  1) [3n2   10n+ 6  2(2n2   6n+ 3)]
8(1  ) (1 + )n4 : (A63)
Substituting (A62) into (A51) to obtain [@ (1(:) + 2(:)) =@m] jm= and (A63) into (A61) to
obtain [@3(:)=@m] jm= and adding the two terms, we obtain

@211=@
2
m
 jm= (see (A44)),
that is
@211
@2m
jm= =  
(n  1)
8<: (n  1) [6n
3   3n2   6n+ 4  (2n3   7n2 + 10n  4)]
  [5n4   3n3   12n2 + 12n  4  (5n4   17n3 + 26n2   16n+ 4)]
9=;
8(1  )(1 + )2n5 :
(A64)
Substituting  by  given by (11) into this expression, we obtain
@211
@2m
jm= =  
[n2   n+ 2  (n2   2n+ 2)]
24 2(n3   n+ 1) + 22(n  1)2
  (2n3 + 3n2   6n+ 4)
35
16(1  )3n5 : (A65)
One can observe that the sign of this expression is always negative for any   0. For   0, one
can easily show that
 
@211=@
2
m
 jm= = 0 as three roots in , that is
1 =
n2   n+ 2
n2   2n+ 2 ;
2 =
2n3 + 3n2   6n+ 4  np4n3(n  1) + 17n2   20n+ 12
4(n  1)2 ; (A66)
3 =
2n3 + 3n2   6n+ 4 + np4n3(n  1) + 17n2   20n+ 12
4(n  1)2 :
It can be easily veried that 1 and 3 are strictly larger than 1 for any n  2. As a result,
condition (ii) of denition is veried if and only if   2  .
12Since the mathematical expressions are very long, we only write the values of these expressions evaluated
at m = . We also used the Mathematical software to be sure not to have made any errors in the computation
of these derivatives.
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